The trouble with brain imaging: hope, uncertainty and ambivalence in the neuroscience of autism by Fitzgerald, Des
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/76424/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Fitzgerald, Des 2014. The trouble with brain imaging: hope, uncertainty and ambivalence in the
neuroscience of autism. BioSocieties 9 (3) , pp. 241-261. 10.1057/biosoc.2014.15 file 
Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/biosoc.2014.15
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/biosoc.2014.15>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
The trouble with brain-imaging: hope, uncertainty and ambivalence in the 
neuroscience of autism 
 
Des Fitzgerald 
Cardiff University 
FitzgeraldP@cardiff.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is a pre-print (i.e. the version before peer review) of an article published 
in BioSocieties. The definitive publisher-authenticated version [Fitzgerald, D. 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞƚƌŽƵďůĞǁŝƚŚďƌĂŝŶ-imaging: hope, uncertainty and ambivalence in the 
ŶĞƵƌŽƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŽĨĂƵƚŝƐŵ ? ?BioSocieties, 9: 241-261 is available online at: 
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/biosoc/journal/v9/n3/abs/biosoc201415a.html 
doi:10.1057/biosoc.2014.15 
2 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
This paper is about ambivalent dynamics of hope and uncertainty within 
neurobiological autism research. While much literature has commented on the 
positive hopes and expectations that surround technoscientific projects (van Lente and 
Rip, 1998; Brown et al., 2000) few have focused on less promissory visions ± and, in 
particular, on the presence of uncertainty, as well as unease and disappointment, 
among working scientists. This paper shows how autism neuroscientists actually talk 
about their research in ambivalent, entangled registers of both promising hope and 
disappointed uncertainty. The paper locates the dynamic between these in an 
µLQWHUPHGLDWHWHUUDLQ¶RIDXWLVPUHVHDUFK ± in which autism iVERWKµSUHVHQW¶DVDQ
HSLGHPLRORJLFDODQGVRFLDOIRUFHEXWDOVRµDPELJXRXV¶DVDQRW\HWZHOO-defined 
clinical and scientific object. It argues that neuroscientists work through this terrain 
by drawing not only on a discourse of unalloyed hope and promise, but by entangling 
their rHVHDUFKZLWKLQDPRUHFRPSOH[UHJLVWHURIµVWUXFWXUHGDPELYDOHQFH¶ZKLFK
includes languages of uncertainty, unease and disappointment. As well as showing the 
novelty of research within DXWLVP¶VµLQWHUPHGLDWHWHUUDLQ¶WKis brings a new 
SHUVSHFWLYHWRWKHµVRFLRORJ\RIH[SHFWDWLRQV¶%URZQDQG0LFKDHODUguing for 
more attention to low expectations among scientific researchers.   
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Introduction 
Much recent scholarship has drawn attention to the way that technoscientific projects, 
including those within the life sciences, are animated by discursive structures of hope, 
optimism, and positive expectation (van Lente and Rip, 1998; Brown et al., 2000; 
Borup et al., 2006). But there has been little sustained attention to the presence of 
more ambivalent scientific discourses ± and the degree to which expressions of   
uncertainty, disappointment and unease also feature at the heart of some of these 
projects. For example, social-science scholars have shown how neurobiological 
research has frequently oriented itself to the illumination of tricky psychiatric and 
psychological categories, precisely through µLPDJLQHGIXWXUHV¶RILPSURYHGGLDJQRVLV
targeted intervention, and effective biomedical therapy (Choudhary et al., 2009; 
Vrecko, 2010; Choudhary and Slaby, 2012: 5). However, recent work by Pickersgill 
(2011) on promises within the neuroscience of psychopathy ± where Pickersgill draws 
especially on his interviews with front-line scientists and practitioners ± suggests that 
within the practice of neurobiological research, there might be rather more 
uncertainty, and rather less positive expectation, than has previously been identified.  
In this paper, I explore some of the ways in which neuroscientific research on a 
psychological or psychiatric diagnosis is animated by ambivalent dynamics of hope 
and disappointment. Focusing in particular on neurobiological autism research, my 
argument is that there are spaces of neuroscientific practice that are not only propelled 
by a promissory vision, but that are entangled within a much more dynamic imaginary 
of promising hope and disappointed uncertainty. I argue that DVPXFKDVDµVRFLRORJ\
RIH[SHFWDWLRQV¶%URZQDQG0LFKDHOKDVWDXJKWXVDERXWWKHJHQHUDWLYHUROHRI
promise in the life sciences, expressions of these more negative expectations are not 
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only thickly present within neuroscientific research, but they may actually be 
important for the maintenance of particularly ambiguous neuroscientific projects.   
Autism research is ideal for thinking about these dynamics. If, in recent 
decades, autism has dramatically increased in diagnostic prevalence (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2009; CDC, 2012), has emerged as a figure of popular and political concern 
(Murray, 2008: 2; Great Britain, 2009), and has also become a growing site of social 
action and contest (Bumiller, 2008; Hart, this issue), the specificity of its biological 
manifestations, and especially that of its neurobiology, remain stubbornly outside the 
grasp of researchers (Lord et al., 2012: 491). In this special issue, contributing authors 
have identified DQµLQWHUPHGLDWHWHUUDLQ¶formed by these gaps, a set of novel 
biological and social possibilities that have emerged from the co-presence of 
uncertainty and visibility *XHVWHGLWRUV¶LQWURGXFWLRQWKLVLVVXH. Around the still-
emerging category of autism, a productive space has emerged for scientific, medical 
and political actors, as well as people diagnosed with autism and their allies, to 
actually reconfigure and rethink the ways that complex, biosocial spaces of research, 
action and care are structured and held together (ibid.). 
In this paper, I argue that within this terrain we can also see the emergence of a 
novel way of relating neuroscientific research to imagined futures. I show that 
neurobiological autism researchers certainly trace their scientific interest through a 
promissory logic of hope and expectation; but also, sometimes, they work through 
parallel registers of disappointment, unease, and anxiety. I am not arguing that autism 
neuroscience is doomed or hopeless, or that its researchers are overwhelmingly 
marked by despondency and disillusion. My argument LVWKDWWKHµLQWHUPHGLDWH
WHUUDLQ¶RIDXWLVPUHVHDUFKRSHQVXSDQRYHOVSDFHIRUWKH future-oriented imaginary of 
neurobiological research, a space in which neuroscience might not only be animated 
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by positive expectation, but in which it may be strung between more delicate and 
ambivalent dynamics of hope and disappointment. This may not be unique to autism, 
but I argue that the µLQWHUPHGLDWHWHUUDLQ¶RI autism research, and the zone of unlikely 
alliances and loops that surrounds it, makes autism a potent site for seeing this 
complexity.  
To make this argument, I will first use published accounts to demonstrate the 
increased social presence of autism, but also the sense of uncertainty that surrounds 
neurobiological autism research. In the rest of the paper, I will draw on data from 
thirty-seven semi-structured qualitative interviews that I conducted with UK-based 
autism neuroscientists (including a small number of third-sector funders and 
organisers) between 2010 and 2011. First, I use this material to show that autism 
research is indeed frequently narrated through languages of hope and expectation ± 
and particularly through the excitement of finding a biomarker for autism, and of 
uncovering autism as an essentially organic phenomenon. In the subsequent section, 
however, I show that there is also a strong current of disappointment in, and anxiety 
about, the methods and assumptions that are built into neurobiological autism 
research. But my argument will not be that these parallel dynamics are contradictory 
or problematic. I will suggest, instead, that they are embedded in the complexity of 
doing neurobiological research on a diagnostic phenomenon marked by both presence 
and ambiguity. They reflect the novelty with which autism researchers move through 
some ambiguous terrain, as well as the ambivalence with which they reflect on it.  
 
Ambiguity and presence 
If you ask a neuroscientist what autism is, they might tell you that autism is a complex 
neurodevelopmental spectrum disorder with characteristic deficits in three domains: 
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social interaction, communication, and repetitive behaviour (APA, 2000). They might 
also mention that autism is strongly heritable (Bailey et al., 1995), that it is 
diagnosable in about one in one-hundred school-age children (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2009), and that, in the UK, it costs the economy about £34 billion every year (Knapp, 
2012). But then, after a pause, they might tell you that none of this is either 
straightforward or uncontested. For one thing, proposed changes to the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (DSM) would remove communication from the 
three domains, and would also collapse the distinction between autism and cognate 
GLDJQRVHVOLNH$VSHUJHU¶V6\QGURPH$3$, 2011). The one in one-hundred figure 
may have to be revised too ± a March 2012 report from the Centres for Disease 
Control, in the United States, increased this to one in eighty-eight (CDC, 2012), while 
the £34-billion cost, already a notable increase from a 2009 estimate (Knapp et al, 
2009), is described as µWHQWDWLYH¶.QDSS0RUHWRWKHSRLQWSHUKDSVWKHUHLV
also now some disagreement about whether the triad, causally, actually composes a 
single neurodevelopmental disorder (Geschwind and Levitt, 2007; Happé and Ronald, 
2008ZKLOHWKHµVSHFLILFJHQHWLFHWLRORJ\¶RIDXWLVPDIWHUPRUHWKDQDGHFDGHRI
UHVHDUFKµUHPDLQVODUJHO\XQNQRZQ¶*XSWDDQG6WDWH: 429). Skating across all 
of this, there are also now political contests over whether we might characterize 
DXWLVPDVDµGLVRUGHU¶LQWKHILUVWSODFH± and even if it might not, in some way, mark 
certain talents or advantages (Ortega, 2009; Happé and Frith 2010). µ:HNQRZPRUH
DERXWDXWLVPQRZWKDQDWDQ\SRLQWLQKLVWRU\¶VD\VWKHFXOWXUDO historian and autism 
SDUHQW6WXDUW0XUUD\µ\HWDWWKHVDPHWLPHLIZH¶UHKRQHVWWKHIRXQGDWLRQDO
REVHUYDWLRQWKDWZHPLJKWPDNHWKH³FHQWUDOIDFW´DERXWDXWLVPZLWKZKLFKZHVKRXOG
SUREDEO\VWDUWLVWKDWZHGRQ¶WNQRZYHU\PXFKDERXWLWDWDOO¶12: 1). 
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 What has perhaps remained most striking about autism is that even as it has 
emerged as a focus of popular and political concern, even as it is located within both 
the bodies and habits of an ever-larger number of people, even as more and more 
research paradigms are brought to bear on it, DQGHYHQWKHUHIRUHDVLWVµSUHVHQFH¶ as a 
SKHQRPHQRQWKDWµFDQQRWDQGZLOOQRWXOWLPDWHO\EHUHPRYHG¶becomes more 
solidified ± so has autism continued to resist any sort of easy clinical or biological 
definition (Murray, 2008: 16). This is a significant part of what has been described in 
WKHLQWURGXFWLRQWRWKLVVSHFLDOLVVXHDVWKHµHSLVWHPLFPXUN¶RIDXWLVPUHVHDUFK7KHUH
is a yawning gap between, on the one side, the prominence of autism as a clinical, 
epidemiological and social force, and, on the other side, what can be said with any 
certainty about autism as a neurological, genetic or diagnostic object. This gap has 
created a complex space of biosocial possibility: for example, just as new ways of 
thinking DERXWWKHELRORJ\RIDXWLVP¶VGLVSHUVHGDQGYDULDEOHJHQHWLFPDUNHUVPD\
eventually come to mark out new kinds of people (Navon, 2011), so might the space 
of political contest around emerging categories of autistic identity be enrolled in new 
forms of neurobiological essentialism, but now somewhere far from the laboratory 
(Ortega and Choudhary, 2011). For a diagnosis that seems most likely to mark a 
disorder of brain development, this gap is particularly vivid in the space of 
neurobiological research. In an exhaustive recent review, Lord et al. noted that while 
there had been great hopes for both structural and functional neuroimaging findings, 
µWKHVHDSSURDFKHVVHOGRPSURYLGHGDWDRQDQLQGLYLGXDOOHYHOGRQRW\HWKDYHZHOO-
accepted standards or UHSOLFDELOLW\DFURVVWLPHRUVLWH«DQGKDYHUDUHO\DGGUHVVHG
TXHVWLRQVRIVSHFLILFLW\RIILQGLQJVWR$6'¶ In other words, and despite 
some years of research, we still lack a convincing, well-replicated brain-based autism 
biomarker. And yet, as &KORH6LOYHUPDQSRLQWVRXWµDOWKRXJKUHVHDUFKHUVKDYHKDG
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trouble finding localized structural changes, autism has retained its identity as a 
JHQHWLFGLVRUGHURIWKHEUDLQ¶This leaves neuroscientists in an awkward 
place: unable to tack autisPWRDQHPHUJLQJSURMHFWRIµQHXURUHGXFWLYH¶FHUWDLQW\
(Martin, 2004), neuroscientists are equally unable to simply ignore both the evidence 
and the desire for a neurogenetic basis to the disorder (Yates, 2010).   
How do autism neuroscientists work through this terrain? My suggestion is that 
one novel method that autism neuroscientists have drawn upon is a delicate 
reconfiguration of the relationship between research and hope. 6LQFHDWOHDVWµWKH
GHFDGHRIWKHEUDLQ¶WKHEURDGILHOGRIµQHXURVFLHQFH¶KDVEeen associated, internally 
and externally, with defining discourses of confidence and promise (Andreasen 2001; 
Ortega and Vidal, 2010). But it has only recently been noted that the neuroscientists 
who labour within this field may be inflected with more anxiety, unease, and 
ambivalence. IQKLVDQDO\VLVRIWKHµWHFKQRVRPDWLFLPSHUDWLYH¶RIWKHQHZEUDLQ
sciences, for example, Pickersgill (2011) has poinWHGWRDµSURPLVVRU\GLVFRXUVH¶ that 
structures the relationship between psychopathology, technology, and the body. But 
he also argues that this does not tell the whole story: 
The embedding of this therapeutic promise within the talk and practice of 
scientists and mental health professionals is far from 
VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG«QHXURVFLHQFHHQJHQGHUVFRQVLGHUDEOHambivalence, 
expressed both by clinicians and scientists themselves (ibid.:  460).  
In the rest of this paper, I want to use the gaps and possibilities that surround autism 
neuroscience to build on this suggestion. In particular, and drawing on my interviews 
with autism neuroscientists, I want to show how researchers narrate their own 
expectations through an ambivalent dynamic of both promise and unease. My goal is 
not to operationalize specific kinds of negative expectation (identifying, e.g. particular 
9 
 
UROHVIRUµGLVDSSRLQWPHQW¶RUXQHDVH¶LQWKHPVHOYHVEXWWRSRLQWWRDEURDGHUSUHVHQFH
of low expectation, characterised by the repeated use of these ± and related ± 
discursive registers. My core argument is that sustaining and managing an ambivalent 
dynamic between such hopeful and disappointed registers is what allows 
neurobiological autism researchers to work within a space characterised by both 
presence and ambiguity. I argue that this dynamic is another instance of the novel 
possibilities engendered by the strange terrain of autism research ± but one that also 
may call for wider attention to structures of disillusion and disappointment within 
neuroscience.  
 
The dream is to intervene 
When I began interviewing autism neuroscientists, I initially found that their talk was 
often shot-through with rich discourses of hope, possibility and positive expectation. 
Of course, the study of mental disorder has often been structured by a sense of 
therapeutic hope for the future (Moreira and Palladino, 2005). For the more complex 
neurodevelopmental disorders, this hope has recently become embedded in the search 
for brain-based biomarkers particularly ± and in the emergence of neuroscientific 
technologies that might mark these out (Raff, 2009). In the first pages of the first issue 
of Nature published this decade, for example, the editors self-consciously framed the 
VDVµDdecadHIRUSV\FKLDWULFGLVRUGHUV¶DVHQVHRIRSWLPLVPDQGH[SHFWDWLRQWKDW
was precisely rooted in the idea WKDWµQHZ techniques ² genome-wide association 
studies, imaging and the optical manipulation of neural circuits ² are ushering in an 
era in which the neural circuitry underlying cognitive dysfunctions...will be 
delineated' (Nature, 2010:9). The authors went on, citing the US National Institutes of 
Mental Health (NIMH) head, Thomas Insel: 
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'whether for schizophrenia, depression, autism or any other psychiatric 
GLVRUGHUVLWLVFOHDU«that understanding of these conditions is entering a 
scientific phase more penetratingly insightful than has hitherto been 
possible' (ibid).  
I am not interested in assessing the accuracy of such claims. Instead, I am focused on 
the degree to which these kinds of hopes, common enough in a public-facing 
OLWHUDWXUHZHUHPLUURUHGE\WKHIURQWOLQHUHVHDUFKHUVWKDW,VSRNHWRµ:KDWLQWULJXHG
PHLQWKHHDUO\GD\VDERXW0(*>0DJQHWRHQFHSKDORJUDSK\@¶VDLGRQHEUDLQ-imager 
that I interviewed, who had been involved in quite a few studies of autism, 
 is that, first of all, it is a beautiful combination of quantum physics, which 
is the underlying principle of the scanner, and the application to not only 
biological, but human, and even psychiatric problems, or neurological 
SUREOHPV«LWZDVVRUWRILPPHGLDWHO\DYHU\VRUWRIDSSHDOLQJZD\RI
having the dynamics of the human brain measured with a tool which is 
capable of capturing these dynamics. 
This view, that technologies like MEG would open up the human brain, and give new 
insight into psychiatric and neurological problems, was not uncommon: 'all the 
neurology-type people are looking for the biomarker, you know,' one professor of 
SV\FKRORJ\WROGPH
«DQG,WKLQNWKH\KDYHLPSOLFLWO\LQWKHLr heads this notion that 
we will find something which will then [makes a whooshing noise] LW¶OOSDUWOLNHWKH
Red Sea.' Or as a representative of a funding organisation put it:  
WKHUHZDVDYHU\VWURQJVHQVHDERXW\HDUVDJR«WKDWWKHWHFKQRORJLHVWR
create the breakthroughs in conditions like autism were coming through ± 
the neuroimaging technologies, the genetic analysis technologies, you know, 
and the sort of bringing to bear, if you like, of those technologies, you 
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know, the sort of access to brain material and the kind of imaging that you 
could do with brain material, and indeed the chemical procedures that you 
could do with brain material. 
For researchers and research-funders, WKLVWHFKQRORJLFDOKRSHRIDFFHVVWRµPDWHULDO¶
expresses the promise of advancing the field in some way. In the case of 
psychological and psychiatric autism research, this goal often manifests as an 
H[SHFWDWLRQRIUHGXFLQJWKHILHOG¶VUHOLDQFHRQEHKDYLRXUDOPHDVXUHV7KLVFDPHXS
during a conversation that I had with one researcher, who was involved in innovative 
work to find a quantitative-organic biomarker for autism. She told me about her 
experience of joining her current research project on autism, and being trained to use 
the ADOS (Autism Diagnostic Interview Schedule), which is often used as a 
screening tool for research participants (Lord et al, 1989). 'I was amazed at how many 
details these people [the trainers] pick up on,' she said 
like, you know, you speak about instrumental movements and so on, goal-
directed actionsDQG,MXVWFRXOGQ¶WVHHLW$QG,FRXOGRQO\GRLWZLWKDORW
more training ± ,¶PWDONLQJPRQWKVKHUH 
Her amazement at the skill required by behavioural analysis is not only a compliment 
to clinical skill: it is also expressive of a more fundamental surprise, i.e. that such skill 
would be required at all. For this researcher, there had to be a better, more predictable, 
way to go about this. And the best hope for this advance lay with the new brain 
sciences: 'If you look at the behavioural studies,' she said,  
 there are not too many differences on the behavioural level, when you look at 
adults. But there are also a few brain studies now coming out that show, 
DFWXDOO\LQWHUPVRIWKHLUDQDWRP\SHRSOHZLWK$VSHUJHU¶VDUHGLIIHUHQWIURP
people with high-functioning auWLVP«LI,ZDVDEHKDYLRXUDOUHVHDUFKHU,
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would feel that that [behavioural autism research] has maybe come to an end, 
because if we are now speaking about, actuDOO\$VSHUJHU¶VRU+)$>KLJK-
functioning autism] is the same behaviourally, what are we going to research 
on ± what comes next?' 
Her basic hope, therefore, is that developments in brain-imaging technology will 
UHYHDODGLIIHUHQFHLQEUDLQDQDWRP\EHWZHHQDXWLVWLFDQGµW\SLFDOO\-GHYHORSLQJ¶
people) wider than the difference in behaviour ± delineating and marking autism at a 
much finer level than is possible for even the most skilled clinician.  
A second and related technological hope had to do with finding an anatomical 
pathway for new kinds of diagnosis and treatment for autism ± which is characteristic 
of contemporary psychiatric-biomarker research in general, but is particularly acute 
within the realm of the neurodevelopmental disorders (Singh and Rose, 2009: 202). 
These two hopes, in turn, are premised on another expectation: if clinicians could 
intervene on the neurological substrate even before behavioural symptoms appeared, 
this would likely prove more effective, and PRUHHIILFLHQWLQWKHORQJWHUPµ3eople 
with autism have got biological differences in brain developmHQW¶VDLGRQHVHQLRU
professor: 
>«@ DQGZH¶YHMXVWLGHQWLILHGZKDWWKRVHGLIIHUHQFHVDUH>XVLQJEUDLQ-
imaging]$QGZH¶UHLQWKHPLGGOHRIVD\LQJµFDQ\RXXVHWKRVH
differences to diagnose people with autism rapidly, and/or in a cost-
effective way?¶ 
7KLVZDVDFRPPRQWKHPHµWKHGUHDPLVWRLQWHUYHQHSULRUWRWKHRQVHWRIV\PSWRP¶
another interviewee VDLGWRPHµ\RXNQRZWRWU\DQGGLYHUWWKHGHYHORSPHQWDO
pathway before the full core symptoms of autism become kind of embedded in the 
V\VWHP¶Discussions of the desire to wring early diagnosis and treatment from 
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neuroscience, though not present in all of my interviews, were never unsubtle. 
Perhaps summing up a fairly common view, one senior figure put it to me like this:  
,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKHUHDUHPDQ\SHRSOHLQDXWLVPZKRZRXOGVD\ WKDWWKH\GRQ¶W
want to understand other people, even if they choose not to engage with 
other people at that level, so I would expect that [one day] we would be able 
to intervene psychologically, neurologically. 
The idea of treatment, especially, is controversial in autism ± and particularly so the 
idea of intervening neurologically at a very early stage (Solomon, 2008),GLGQ¶W
encounter anyone who was unsympathetic to the view that there are good reasons to be 
wary of these. But I still encountered, repeatedly, the hope that people with autism 
would be able to be diagnosed earlier and treated, in the future, specifically by acting 
on the brain. As Laura Schreibman points out, µZHVWLOOKDYHQRFXUHIRUDXWLVP<HW
WKHUHLVUHDVRQWREHKRSHIXO¶3). I encountered many neuroscientists who 
still carried this hope.  
 
Now we have all these wonderful tools  
Quite a few scholars of science and technology have lately turned their attention to 
thinking about the role of  just such positive expectations in gathering together large-
scale, diverse technoscientific projects ± such as the search for a brain-based 
biomarker of autism ± and have identified some of the ways that these projects 
actually get justified and assembled in the present, precisely through the expression of 
some promise or prospect for the future (van Lente and Rip 1998, Brown and Michael 
2003). In particular, scholars have identified the role of specifically promissory 
'expectations' that get attached to scientific and technical projects, and around which 
resources and actors are assembled: 'technological futures are forceful,' van Lente 
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points out: 'once defined as promise, action is required' (2000: 59). By expectations, 
WKHQLVPHDQW
ZLVKIXOHQDFWPHQWVRIDGHVLUHGIXWXUH«K\SHUEROLFexpectations of 
future promises and potential' (Borup et al, 2006: 286). Thus the emphasis is mostly 
(although not entirely) on a collective desire to imagine something basically good for 
the future, through the assembly and propulsion of some scientific and technological 
practice. On the basis of this promise, it becomes reasonable, and even imperative, to 
enact that project or practice in the present. It is in this sense that, for these authors, 
expectations are thought to play a generative role in scientific contexts: they 'guide 
activities, provide structure and legitimation, attract interest and foster investment' 
(ibid.: 285-286). Indeed, as Brown and Michael (2003: 4) have argued, through the 
articulation and enactment of varieties of expectation, the epistemic and practical 
distance between the past and the future is discursively (if not materially) elided: 'the 
future is mobilized in real time,' they point out.  
8QTXHVWLRQDEO\WKLVµVRFLRORJ\RIH[SHFWDWLRQV,¶ although usually focused on 
more public discussions (Kitzinger, 2008), DWOHDVWSDUWO\H[SODLQVZKDW¶VJRLQJRQLQ
my interviews ± insofar as these expressions of hope can also be read as the outline of 
an assembly-practice. In this sense, the loose promise of neurological diagnosis and 
therapy in the future becomes the ground on which large-scale projects are enacted in 
the present. Brown and Michael have also noted an inverse correlation between 
closeness to the actual scientific practice, and the level of expressed hope (2012: 12-
13). And while I found these expressions at all levels among the scientists in my 
interviews, from PhD students to senior professors, some of the more compelling and 
thought-through articulations came from the (slightly more distanced) leaders of 
large-scale projects ± who were clearly not articulating their sense of hope for the first 
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time, and for whom a convincing image of expectation likely played a more directly 
instrumental role. 
For example, when I questioned the Principal Investigator of one large project 
about why, exactly, someone like him, a prominent neuropsychiatrist with diverse 
interests, would pursue a neuroscience of autism, he imagined precisely the kind of 
promising-future scenario that the biomarker discourse is organised around. 'Say you 
go in to an accident and emergency department with a cardiac arrest,' he said: 
Now, option A: you describe to me your symptoms. Crushing chest pain, 
burning sensation going up into your neck, pain coming down your arm, 
right? Feeling sweaty. Not feeling chipSHU$QG,VD\WR\RXµRKUHDOO\"
6RXQGVOLNH\RXPLJKWKDYHVRPHWKLQJJRLQJRQLQ\RXUFKHVW¶%XW\RX
would expect me to do an ECG [Electrocardiogram] to measure the function 
RI\RXUKHDUWULJKW"2ULI\RXZHQWLQWKHUHWKLQNLQJµ,¶YHJRWGLDEHWHV¶
yRX¶GH[SHFWWKHGRFWRUWRPHDVXUH\RXUEORRG-sugar, right? If you went in 
WKHUHZLWKHSLOHSV\\RX¶GEHH[SHFWLQJKLPWRPHDVXUH\RXUEUDLQ-waves. 
Well why should you not be doing the same thing if you go in with a 
biologically-based neurodevelopmental disorder? I want to be measuring 
ZKHWKHU\RX¶YHJRWDQDEQRUPDOLW\LQWKHRUJDQLQTuestion.   
Here is precisely the hope of diagnosis and treatment that is invested in brain-based 
biomarker research, and around which that programme is organised ± i.e. the hope 
that neuroscience will one day make autism as instantly diagnosable as a heart attack. 
What is also interesting about this imagined scenario is that it plots both backwards 
and forwards in time, to argue that the basic promise of a neuroscience of autism is to 
provide access ± conceptual, and methodological ± to the organ that researchers had 
really always been investigating, but to which methods, up to now, had been 
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inadequate. This is at least one part of what a discourse of expectation can do for the 
autism researcher particularly ± which is to make sense of an awkward, troubled past 
and present, and to re-imagine both in the light of some visionary future (see 
Feinstein, 2010, or Silverman, 2012, for accounts of this history). Essentially the same 
view was expressed even more bluntly by another senior scientist, who also sat at the 
apex of a large programme of research. 'I think neuroscience always believes that 
psychology was always a sub-part of neuroscience,' he said, 
but in the 1970s and 1980s within psychology there was a very, very 
strong push to, you know, not be misled by data from neuroscience. And I 
WKLQNLW¶V\RXNQRZSDUWO\DWKHRUHWLFDOWKLQJSDUWO\DPHWKRGVWKLQJDV 
well ± EHFDXVHZHGLGQ¶WUHDOO\KDYHWKHPHWKRGVRWKHUWKDQORRNLQJDW
SDWLHQWVZLWKDYHU\PHVV\EUDLQKDHPRUUKDJHZKLFKZDVQ¶WYHU\\RX
NQRZ«RUGRLQJDQLPDOVWXGLHV1RZZHKDYHDOOWKHVHZRQGHUIXOWRROVIRU
functional imaging of the brain which we diGQ¶WKDYHLQWKRVHGD\V 
Another told me how, today, 
a lot of psychologists have re-directed the focus of their work onto looking 
at not just the cognitive basis of some kind of process like memory, or 
attention, or in my case, social cognition ± but also the brain basis.  
Again, we can see how one of the most significant promises of the new brain sciences 
± WKHXVHRIQHZµZRQGHUIXOWRROV¶WRJHWDWµWKHRUJDQLQTXHVWLRQ¶DQGWKHUHRIWKH
µEUDLQEDVLV¶RIGLVRUGHU± underpins the basic hope that runs through many autism 
QHXURVFLHQWLVWV¶UHIOHFWLRQVRQWKHLURZQSUDFWLFH3UHYLRXVZRUNLQWKHµVRFLRORJ\RI
H[SHFWDWLRQV¶OLWHUDWXUHWHOOVXVWKDWWKHVHDUHQRWHPSW\KRSHVDQGWKDWWKHLU
articulation and re-articulation actually helps to assemble the elements of autism 
neuroscience in the present.  
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But what was also interesting about my interviews with these scientists is that 
hope, optimism and expectation were only one part of the story ± that, at the heart of 
these conversations about the relationship between neuroscience and the autism 
spectrum, there was also a strong current of unease, and disappointment, and even 
some anxiety, about the developing programme of research. This moves us away from 
WKHµH[SHFWDWLRQV¶OLWHUDWXUH,WDOVREHJLQVWRWHOOXVZKat is particular about autism 
research, and about the ambivalent boundaries of the terrain in which it is formed.   
 
A very indirect measure 
As it happens, I had rather expected to find interviewees to be at least cautious, as 
well as hopeful, when they talked about what could be achieved by a contemporary 
autism neuroscience. Indeed, despite prevailing popular and media sentiments about 
µQHXURELRORJLVDWLRQ¶WKHself-urging of restraint, and of explanatory parsimony, is a 
recognisable feature of the public discourse of these disciplines (Dumit 2004; Vul et 
al 2008). But still I had not anticipated the volume of negative sentiment about 
neuroscience, especially imaging neuroscience, and what it could or could not tell you 
about autism, that I heard so frequently from autism neuroscientists. Indeed, and in 
spite of my own self-consciously bland and uncritical presentation, neuroscientific 
autism researchers consistently drew my attention to, for example, the problem of 
false positives, the distance between what their methods measured and what they 
purported to measure, the degree to which neuroimaging simply replicates what is 
already known through other means ± and even the basic inadequacy of brain-imaging 
to mental phenomena in the first place.  
I am not claiming that any of these issues are shocking, or unknown (Hyman, 
2009). In what follows, though, I argue that there is more at stake among these 
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interviewees than an appropriate scientific caution. Above, I showed how I 
encountered scientists who were given to talking about their practice within 
unproblematically hopeful registers of improved clinical and diagnostic intervention 
for people with autism. In this section, I situate this claim a bit more precisely, by re-
considering it in light of some alternative accounts of the future of autism 
neuroscience ± and these are those accounts in which hope and promise were less 
strongly present, and in which the dominant tropes were things like disappointment, 
unease, and even anxiety.    
Consider the following account, which is about functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI) of autism in particular. It comes from a young autism researcher, 
whose intellectual and methodological hinterland was actually more in a hard-nosed 
cognitive neuroscience than it was autism UHVHDUFKRUSV\FKRORJ\DVVXFKµ<RX¶YH
got to be careful with neuroimaging and the questions you ask,' she said 
EHFDXVHWKHSUREOHPZLWKQHXURLPDJLQJ>LVWKDW@\RX¶OODOZD\VJHWD
result ± \RX¶OODOZD\VJHWVRPHEOREV\RXNQRZ">«@,DOways say, I 
XVHGWRODXJKWRSHRSOHDQGVD\µRKP\*RGWKLVLVDQDUWQRWDVFLHQFH¶
[laughs@EHFDXVH«\RX¶YHMXVWJRWWREHVRFDUHIXO$QG,WKLQNWKHUH¶VD
UHDOWUXWKWRQHXURLPDJLQJ,EHOLHYHLQLW%XWLW¶VRQHRIWKRVHWKLQJVWKDW
require replication ± DQGWKHWUXWKZLOORXWDQGLI\RX¶YHGRQHVWXGLHV
on social cognition and 38 of them are showing the superior temporal 
VXOFXVWKHQ,WKLQN\RXFDQKROG\RXUKDQGXSDQGVD\µZHOOWKLVDUHDLV
LQYROYHGLQVRFLDOFRJQLWLRQ¶ZKLFKLVUHDOO\LPSRUWDQWEXWWKHUH¶VDKHOO
RIDORWRIRWKHUEOREVDQGWKDW¶VQRWDYHU\QXDQFHGILQGLQJHLWKHU
[laughs@LW¶VDELWFUXGHVR,WKLQNWRJHW«,WKLQNLW¶VJRWDORQJZD\WR
go, and people have got to be really careful.  
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Here, I particularly want to note the tension between this neuroscientist's commitment 
to the basic truthfulness of the image, and, nonetheless, her acknowledgement of how 
heavily mediated the process of production is, and also how much artifice is 
potentially involved in the interpretation. And although this researcher finds some 
resolution in urging care and in deferring to replication, the nervous laughter, and her 
anxious doubling back even when her account seems to have achieved some basic 
resolution (µLW¶VDELWFUXGH¶, suggests the presence of a deeper and more on-going 
unease.  
This was repeated in other interviews where, in particular, technical problems 
with the generation, processing and handling of brain-imaging data were repeatedly 
forefronted. The following quote comes from a psychiatric neuroimager ± who had 
worked on quite a few autism projects, but who also, and perhaps even more so than 
the person quoted above, was intellectually embedded in the hard science of brain-
imaging analysis. Lamenting the generally weak understanding of the physics of these 
technologies among psychiatrists and psychiatric researchers, he drew particular 
attention to the phenomenon of resting-state data.  The resting-state data came about,' 
he said, 
because people started thinking about so-called deactivations, and 
noticing that these deactivations were appearing in virtually every data-
set. And people ignored them. People literally airbrushed them out of 
WKHLUUHVXOWV7KH\MXVWGLGQ¶WZDQWWRNQRZ 
I was struck, at the time, by how scathing this interviewee was about people's use of 
WKHPHWKRG
WKH\MXVWGLGQ¶WZDQWWRNQRZ
DQGDOVRKRZLUUHGHHPDEO\SUREOHPDWLF
he found the method in general ('virtually every data-set'). This is not a story about the 
need for proper scientific caution; nor is it a story about the basic scientific 
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pragmatism and scepticism that often override tempting rhetoric about the objectivity 
of brain-imaging. This interviewee went on to argue that the growth of brain-scanning 
had less to do with the hope of more accurate accounts of diagnoses like autism, and 
much more to do with cynical self-interest within the political economy of the 
contemporary academy:  µ,I\RX¶UHMXVWVLWWLQJLQDQRIILFHZULWLQJWKLQJVGRZQRQD
SLHFHRISDSHU¶KHsaid, 
WKDWPLJKWEHJUHDWUHVHDUFKEXWGRHVQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\EULQJLQPXFK
income. What brings in income is doing big studies that employ lots of 
people, then those people become dependent on your goodwill, and so 
then you have influence on them. And so obvLRXVO\WKDW¶VWKHZD\LW
works. The huge increase in scanning, of course, people are thinking that 
would be a way to get power and influence by, you know, bringing in 
research money and so on and so on.  
Although this situation of technology within the politics of the university is probably 
not so rare ± it is striking to have this view narrated through the large-scale advent of 
brain scanning, in particular. Moreover, WKLVLQWHUYLHZHH¶VXQHDVHDERXWZKDWZDV
really at stake in large-scale brain-imaging of diagnoses like autism, was matched by 
a broader disappointment in what this imaging practice could realistically achieve: 
µErain imaging is based on a lot of assumptions,' sighed a postdoc that I interviewed, 
'you know you must be measuring something in tKHEUDLQ«EXWLW¶VFRUUHODWHVRIWKDW
WKLQJ¶2UDVDQRWKHUH[SUHVVHGWKHVDPHYLHZµI05,LVDYHU\VWURQJ
>WHFKQRORJ\@«EXWLWLVDYHU\LQGLUHFWPHDVXUH¶ 
 I am not positioning these as counter-examples WRWKHµVRFLRORJ\RI
H[SHFWDWLRQV¶OLWHUDWXUH± whiFKDFNQRZOHGJHVERWKWKDWµH[SHFWDWLRQV¶DUHQRWDOZD\V
positive, and also that even positive imagined futures will generally co-exist with 
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some sense of failure, or simply frustration. As Borup and his colleagues put it: 
'disappointment seems to be built into the way expectations operate in science and 
technology' (2006: 290; see also Rosengarten and Michael, 2009, for an example of 
the way that expectations can form and re-form around changeable scientific objects). 
There is certainly space ZLWKLQWKHµH[SHFWDWLRQV¶PRGHOWRWKHRULVHWKHplace of more 
negative expectations in the way that scientific projects get assembled and re-
assembled, and in particular to think about the presence of negative expectation in the 
everyday labour of research. Nonetheless, by and large, when we are talking about the 
sociological import of 'expectations' in the sustenance of scientific projects, we are 
still usually talking about actors orienting themselves to something they imagine to be 
basically good or optimal. As Brown and his colleagues describe it ± the future in 
question still tends to be one in which:  
gene therapy and nanotechnology will cure disease, cars will drive 
themselves, pigs hearts will be used for organ transplants, computers will 
become an even more ubiquitous part of life, the Internet and the 
Cybercafe will become the venue of choice for our relationships, and so 
on' (2000: 4).    
What we see in the close-up space of neurobiological autism research, however, is a 
significantly more complex and dispersed terrain of expectation ± and one that works 
through some surprisingly uncertain, uneasy and even quite disappointed views of its 
own basic project. It is not enough to describe this data as an under-current of 
knowledgeable scepticism within everyday research ± i.e. one running below public 
expressions of hope. This sense of disappointed uncertainty was too present, and too 
much a feature of my interviews with autism neuroscientists.  My argument now is 
that the on-going generation and sustenance of autism research is actually much more 
22 
 
thickly entangled in a dynamic and ambivalent relationship between languages of 
uncertainty and discourses of hope (Silverman, 2012: 159-160).  
 
The trouble with brain-imaging 
Here is another post-doctoral autism researcher, who was contributing to several 
major brain-imaging studies of autism ± but who, having come to brain-imaging from 
ELRORJ\ZDVDOVRNHHQWRH[SUHVVKHUHDUO\GLVDSSRLQWPHQWVLQWKLVILHOGµ:KHQ\RX
know how the brain wRUNV¶VKHVDLGµDVDELRORJLVW¶ 
so you know what makes brain activity, which is connection between 
QHXURQVDQGLWPDWWHUVZLWKZKLFKSDUWRIWKHEUDLQ\RX¶UHFRQQHFWHGDQG
KRZIDVW\RXJHWWKHUHDQGKRZPXFKLQIRUPDWLRQ\RXFRQYHUJH«XPWKH
only thiQJ\RXJHWIURPEUDLQLPDJLQJLVµWKLVSDUWRIWKHEUDLQLVDFWLYDWHG
DWDSDUWLFXODUWLPH¶,WWHOOV\RXYHU\OLWWOHDERXWWKHQHXUDOPHFKDQLVP
and how things get connected to each other. 
Here, the interviewee shifts from a basic concern with the distance between brain 
activity and some measurable vascular response, to a more specific uncertainty about 
the solidity of the relationship between the kind of data generated by brain-imaging 
measures, and, in general, 'how the brain works.' I want to draw attention, in particular, 
to the ways that some important normative divisions are being constructed here ± 
between brain-imaging and biology, on the one hand, and even between brain-imaging 
and brain science, on the other. A senior molecular biologist of autism said something 
very similar, but she embedded her qualms, not so much in terms of the way that 
connections were being elided, but in the degree of fineness achievable from brain-
imaging:   
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in autism, along with a lot of other conditions, like schizophrenia and even 
WKHQHXURGHJHQHUDWLYHFRQGLWLRQV\RXUHDOO\QHHGWRXQGHUVWDQGZKDW¶V
JRLQJRQZLWKJHQHH[SUHVVLRQLQWKHEUDLQ«7KHWURXEOHZLWKEUDLQ-
imaging is that it only gets you down to a certain level of fineness in its 
GHWHFWLRQ6R\RXFDQ¶WWHOOZKDW¶VJRLQJRQDWWKHFHOOXODUOHYHODQGDWWKH
molecular level ± ZKLFKLVZKDW\RXUHDOO\QHHGWRXQGHUVWDQGLI\RX¶UH
going to see what the genes are doing, and what it might be possible to do 
to improve symptoms that some people with autism have >«@3HRSOHLQ
brain-LPDJLQJWDONDVLIWKH\¶UHORRNLQJDWSDWKRORJ\LQWKHLUEUDLQ-images. 
%XWWKH\¶UHQRW  
On one level, we could read, here, a standard wet-lab biologist's unease about over-
interpretation of the brain image, and some disappointment about its eminence in the 
fieldµWKLVWUHPHQGRXVHPSKDVLVRQLPDJLQJ¶VKHVDLGODWHUµ[«] has led people to 
WKLQNWKDWHYHU\WKLQJ¶VYLUWXDOWKHVHGD\VZKHQDFWXDOO\LWRQO\JHWV\RXDFHrtain 
ZD\WKDWYLUWXDOUHDOLW\¶ But it is also interesting that the focus of her unease is not an 
over-interpreting public discourse; her worry is about the limitation of a brain-
imaging study of something like autism in the first place.  
This sense of limit, which was one of the most consistent sources of unease and 
disappointment expressed about brain-imaging within my interviews, came out in a 
few different ways. For some, it was about thinking small:  µLn some forms of 
UHVHDUFK¶VDLGD\RXQJSV\FKLDWrist,  
I suppose you might come up with a finding which sort of clearly changes 
the game. And in brain-LPDJLQJLQDXWLVPLW¶VUDUHO\WKDWVRUWRIILQGLQJ
So, the findings usually sort of move things on in very small steps.  
24 
 
For others, it was about recognising ineffable complexity:  µ,GRQ¶WWKLQNLW¶VHYHU\
JRLQJWRDVVLPSOHDV³WKHUHLVWKLVSRLQWLQWKHEUDLQWKDWLVG\VIXQFWLRQDODQGWKLVLV
FDXVLQJDXWLVP´said a PhD student, µ,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDW¶VHYHU\JRLQJWRKDSSHQ,
GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDW¶VWUXH¶For a more senior investigator, the problem was lack of 
VSHFLILFLW\µTuite a good pub game¶KHVDLG µLVQDPHDUHJLRQRIWKHEUDLQWKDWKDVQ¶W
been associated with autism, by somebody or some pDSHU,W¶VYLUWXDOO\LPSRVVLEOH¶
Of course, these are not suggestions that the neuroscience of autism is intrinsically 
bad or misguided. But there is nonetheless a subtle but consistent sense, here, in 
which the neuroscience of autism is described as limited small-scale, dispersed, and 
(so far, at least) not very specific. Whatever hopes had been attached to their research, 
these scientists also expressed some quite consistently low expectations for the 
neuroscience of autism. None of them thought that this meant neuroimaging research 
VKRXOGQ¶WEHGRQHDQGVHYHUDOZHQWRQWRWDONDERXWWKHPRYHWRµFRQQHFWLYLW\¶RU
some other new paradigm), but I was nonetheless struck by the way in which the 
neuroscience of autism was consistently self-constructed through an idiom of 
uncertainty, one that emphasised the biases, the difficulties, and the partial truths.  
It is important to note that these claims are not just aberrations or counter-
examples of a broader structure of hope, nor are they the predictable post-hoc 
sentiments of people whRVHUHVHDUFKKDVQ¶WZRUNHGRXW. Low expectations neither 
correlate with disappointed careers in my sample, nor are they particularly found 
among the junior and the put-upon: all of the people just quoted were visibly 
µVXFFHHGLQJ¶LQWKHLUFDUHHUVE\DQ\UHasonable measure. My argument is not that I 
have found neuroscientists who are unhappy or drifting, or who find themselves 
inadequate. Nor have I found a cohort of comfortable field-leaders, whose long-
established sinecures give free rein to their doubts. I am trying to show, instead, how 
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autism research is traced through registers of low expectation as well as structures of 
µSURPLVVRU\KRSH¶,QSDUWLFXODUDutism neuroscience is narrated by its own 
practitioners within a register of distinct unease and uncertainty about how a 
neuroscience of autism might actually come about, and what it would look like if it did 
± as much as it is structured by a sense of expectation for the therapeutic and 
diagnostic hopes that neurobiological research may eventually realise. 
 
Structured ambivalence 
What I have found, then, is not only a sense of hope, but a much more ambivalent 
attitude to the future of autism neuroscience. My argument is that this may not be 
incidental to autism ± and that in fact a sense of µstructured ambivalence¶RUD
discursive register that works through a dynamic of both hope and disappointment, can 
be interpreted via the complex and shifting zone of autism research, care and practice 
that I described at the beginning. This is a zone that  may be less defined by the 
µVXFFHVV¶RUµIDLOXUH¶RIresearch that takes place within it, but is instead marked by 
both the things that researchers simply µGRQ¶WNQRZ¶DERXWDXWLVP0XUUD\
and, nonetheless, claims upRQDXWLVP¶VELRORJLFDOSUHVHQFH and essence (Ortega and 
Choudhury, 2011) ± a zone in which, for example, the emergence of an ever-tighter 
institutional complex around the diagnosis (Eyal et al, 2010) has co-evolved with an 
increasingly  µIUDFWLRQDEOH¶DQGGLVSHUVHGYLHZIURP psychology and psychiatry 
(Happé and Ronald, 2008; Anney et al., 2012).  
Autism neuroscience thus does not move towards a clearly imagined future, but 
neither does it simply stop in its tracks: variously firm and tentative neurobiological 
markers continue to be both researched and proposed, even if, as yet, none of them 
have caught on (Ecker et al., 2010; Spencer et al., 2011). Neurobiological autism 
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research thus does not progress, even in its own self-narration, in an obviously linear 
fashion. Instead, it works more delicately through the zone of ambiguity and presence 
that surrounds the biological and social hinterland of autism. As I described in the first 
section, the modest outcomes of brain-imaging, and the expectations that can be 
attached to those outcomes, have to be set alongside a whole range of other actors, 
institutions and literatures variously committed to the indelibility of autistic presence. 
Within such a zone, intellectual work that might otherwise be carried along by a 
straightforward discourse of neurobiological reduction needs to find a more complex 
language. In particular, my data shows how a µYLVLRQ¶RIDXWLVP¶V neurobiological 
future, if it is to make sense in the present, needs to have something more intricate to 
draw upon, than those phrases supplied by the strait-laced semantics of hope: to 
persevere within a zone of both ambiguity and presence, autism neuroscientists must 
learn to speak the languages of uncertainty, unease, and disappointment too. And 
while I do not claim that the careful and structured ambivalence that results is unique 
to autism research ± I do locate the degree to which it is forefronted in this space 
precisely with the kinds of uncertain and complex biosocial repertoires that have 
formed around autism research, and that have EHFRPHHQWDQJOHGZLWKDXWLVP¶V
emerging possibilities for complex biological and social claims.  
A final set of examples to demonstrate this: perhaps most damningly for a 
practice that lives or dies on its sense of efficacy, there were also suggestions that the 
neuroscience of autism would only ever go over ground already well-trodden by other 
H[SHULPHQWDOSV\FKRORJLHVµTo me¶VDLGRQHOHFWXUHULQFRJQLWLYHSV\FKRORJ\µit 
NLQGRIDGGVDOD\HURIGHVFULSWLRQ« 
WKLVLVDYHU\VLPSOHH[DPSOHEXWVD\ZH¶UHWDlking about face-processing 
and I say that children behaviourally have difficulties processing faces. 
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And you can do tests to show this. And then, at the neural level, they show 
less activity in the fusiform face area for faces. To me, that kind of is just 
DQRWKHUOHYHORIGHVFULSWLRQ,WGRHVQ¶WH[SODLQDQ\WKLQJ 
In my reading of her remarks, this lecturer is quite deliberately trying to enact a firm 
division between cognitive-psychological and neuroscientific studies of autism, 
positioning them as different (even competing) areas in which to seek the most richly 
explanatory substrate of a given mental state ± and she is arguing that the actual 
contribution of neuroscience is unclear. This expresses another element of this general 
ambivalence, which is that neuroscientists of autism have been scanning brains for 
some time now, and yet it's not clear that the field has dramatically moved forward in 
that period. µ,WKLQNORRNLQJDWWKHEUDLQLVXVHIXOLQVRPHUHVSHFWV
VDLGD\RXQJ
postdoc echoing this view 'but, um, I mean I am always saying that I think a lot of sort 
of neuroscientific work, especially in terms of fMRI or stuff like that, is a process of 
re-deVFULELQJZKDWZHNQRZDOUHDG\¶2UDVDQRWKHUOHFWXUHUSXWLW 
I did see a talk here recently on - LWZDVFDOOHGµWKHQHXURLPDJLQJRIDGKG¶
and that was what it was. And of course functional neuroimaging by itself 
is meaningless. Because it is just lightiQJXSSLFWXUHV¶ 
It seems to me that what these researchers are articulating, when they say things like 
'it's meaningless' or 'it doesn't explain anything' is a basic anxiety that there has been a 
disciplinary over-investment in a disappointing brain-science ± and that, in fact, 
attaching categories like autism to localised neurological signatures might not add a 
great deal to the field. This is where I think we reach something close to the opposite 
of a promissory vision, and we begin to see the draw of a structured ambivalence. µ,
WKLQN,ZRUU\WKDWWKHUH¶VVRPXFKHPSKDVLVRQEUDLQV¶VDLGD\RXQJOHFWXUHUµ,WKLQN
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ZHQHHGWRNQRZZKDW¶VJRLQJRQDWWKHQHXUDOOHYHO± um, but we also need to know 
how kids with autism think, and feel, and view the world.¶ 
My argument is that the consistency of these kinds of claims, in which this 
specific group of people, whose professional identity is wholly or partly invested in 
some practice of doing brain-imaging studies of autism, but who nonetheless 
frequently position brain-imaging as either partial, or flawed, or slow, or misleading, 
or invalid, or maybe just inappropriate to studying things like autism in the first place 
± that the preponderance of these accounts finally adds up to something noteworthy. 
The thick patina of low expectation that seems, somehow, inseparable from so many 
of these neuropsychologists' and neuropsychiatrists' accounts of their daily practice 
requires an additional kind of explanation for how these researchers orient themselves 
to the future. My emphasis has been on the location of autism research within a 
strange zone of biological productivity and opacity, as well as political contest and 
scientific uncertainty. I argue that this zone has necessitated a different, and much 
more ambivalent, kind of discursive and imaginary strategy than one of positive 
expectation alone. In particular, at least within the space of autism neuroscience, it has 
required researchers to learn to narrate their research in dynamic registers, in which 
hopes and promises have become tempered by disappointments, anxieties and 
uncertainties. As well as bringLQJDQHZSHUVSHFWLYHWRWKHµVRFLRORJ\RIH[SHFWDWLRQV¶
and to studies of neurobiological research, this is also a powerful example of the kinds 
of novel languages and repertories that have formed around autism research, and of the 
strange spaces within which ordinary autism scientists have to locate themselves. This 
LVIXUWKHUHYLGHQFHRIWKHµLQWHUPHGLDWHWHUUDLQ¶ZLWKLQZKLFKSUDFWLFHVof research, 
care and activism have taken shape around autism ± and of the importance of 
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understanding autism in thinking about the configurations and reconfigurations that 
particularly mark the contemporary biosciences.  
 
Conclusion 
7KHµVRFLRORJ\RIH[SHFWDWLRQV¶KDVEHHQDpotent frame for thinking about the ways 
that scientific projects are both assembled and sustained, and it has not been my goal 
to fundamentally disagree with this literature. What I have tried to show, instead, is 
that there are technoscientific spaces that seem to proceed also within more strange 
and dynamic registers of hope and disappointment; my major point has been, 
therefore, that a subterranean discourse of low expectationDVZHOODVWKHµVWUXFWXUHG
ambivaOHQFH¶WKDWDGPLWVRILW may need to be brought more prominently into 
discussions of scientific futures. And these low expectations are present at all levels, 
and all career-stages, within the sample of autism neuroscientists that I spoke to. 
Seeing the co-presence of both registers so present, and dispersed, I argued that 
working through a register of ambivalence allows neuroscientists to enact and sustain 
projects that have an in-built ambiguity or uncertainty. In the case of autism research, 
I showed how that ambiguity is particularly manifest in the intermediate zone of, on 
the one hand, DXWLVP¶VVRFLDODQGFOLQLFDOSUHVHQFHDQG, on the other, its 
neurobiological and genetic uncertainty ± a complex, entangled space that has allowed 
a variety of actor to make a series of novel links between shifting biosocial categories. 
I argued that neurobiological researchers thus need to work through and across a more 
dynamic, ambivalent terrain of expectation ± one that can gather together both 
promises and disappointments. Finally, while this special issue has drawn attention to 
the salient gap around autism research particularly, it may be that similar dynamics of 
hope and disappointment play a similar role in other neuropsychiatric and 
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neurobiological spaces. If autism has had a particularly awkward terrain of 
emergence, it is not the only diagnostic category where presence and biology are 
poorly matched (Kapur et al., 2012). Autism research is a particularly rich site for 
social scientists of health and illness ± but whether autism neuroscience is unusual in 
this particular regard, or simply pioneering, remains to be seen.  
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